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PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION
COMPETITION ACT OF 1979
On June 7, 1979, Senator Howard Cannon, co-sponsor of legisla-
tion resulting in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA),' intro-
duced new aviation legislation in the U.S. Senate, namely, the In-
ternational Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 (ICA). 2
Although the ADA changed provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 regarding international aviation, the bulk of its amendments re-
late to promotion of free competition in interstate and overseas opera-
tions. 3 The proposed ICA seeks to expand the promotion of and
dependence on free market forces in the area of international avia-
tion.
The ICA proposes to change the policy factors to be considered
by the CAB in exercising its duties under the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 (Act). ' Except for one caveat, the CAB would now be able to
consider ten of the eleven factors enumerated by the ADA as
applicable to interstate and overseas transportation which are in the
public interest and in accordance with public convenience and neces-
sity. Besides the primary goal of safety, the remaining factors are fo-
cused uniformly around the promotion, development, and protection
of, and reliance upon a competitive air transportation system where
decisions are made by private, informed, and unrestricted decision-
makers influenced only by free market forces. The CAB would favor
the availability of low-price options, the use of secondary and satellite
airports, the entry of new carriers into the industry, and the expan-
sion of existing carriers into additional markets. In placing "maximum
reliance upon competitive market forces and on actual and potential
competition" to foster the needed air transportation system and
* B.S. Auburn University; M.B.A. University of Tennessee, J.D. University of
Miami School of Law. Mr. Owens is currently on the legal staff of Eastern Air Lines,
Miami, Florida.
1. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
2. Congressional Record, S. 1300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 7198
(1979).
3. See generally, Aviation Report, 10 LAw. AM. 1030, 1033-37 (1978).
4. ICA §§ 2, 3 amending Act § 102(a),(c), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a),(c) (Supp. 1979).
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healthy air carriers, the CAB would take into account "[m]aterial differ-
ences, if any, which may exist between interstate and overseas air
transportation, on the one hand, and foreign air transportation, on the
other." 5
When issuing certificates of public convenience and necessity to
United States air carriers, the ICA instructs the CAB to approve any
applications if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able, and
that the air transportation sought to be approved is consistent with
public convenience and necessity. 6 The ADA lowered the require-
ments an applicant must meet in order to receive authority to furnish
interstate and overseas air transportation. 7 Under the ICA amend-
ment, the applicant would no longer have to show that the proposed
foreign air transportation is required by public convenience and
necessity. 8 Similar changes to the standards for granting certificates
for charter 9 and temporary air transportation are also proposed. 10
The ICA would give the CAB discretionary power to suspend the
certificate authority of a United States airline in a foreign air transpor-
tation market and to grant such authority to an alternative airline
when the CAB finds that the restrictions of the relevant bilateral
agreement prevent appointment of an additional airline. 1 The appli-
cant must also be qualified and "[pirovide substantially improved serv-
ice, substantially lower fare or rates, or a substantially improved
combination" thereof, 12 Finally, the CAB must not find that such
action would be otherwise inconsistent with public convenience and
necessity. The powers of certification and suspension may be exer-
cised in an expeditious manner, unless the incumbent requests, or
the CAB finds, that an oral evidentiary hearing is required. However,
the CAB may suspend a carrier after notice and receipt of the car-
rier's views, without hearing, where the carrier has given ninety days
notice of its intent to suspend all service to a foreign point, or the
carrier fails to provide any significant service to the point for the
ninety days prior to the CAB's notice.
Requirements for the issuance of a foreign air carrier permit
would also be less stringent. This type of permit would be issued if
5. ICA § 2 amending Act § 102(a)(4), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (Supp. 1979).
6. ICA § 4 amending Act § 401(d)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
7. ADA § 8 amending § 401(d)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 137(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
8. Act § 401(d)(1)(B), 49 U.S.c. § 1371(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1979).
9. ICA § 4 amending Act § 401(d)(3), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(3) (Supp. 1979).
10. ICA § 4 amending Act § 401(d)(2), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d)(2) (Supp. 1979).
11. ICA § 4 amending Act § 401(g), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g) (Supp. 1979).
12. Id.
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the applicant: (1) is fit, willing, and able; (2) is qualified, and has been
designated by its government; or (3) the transportation applied for
"will be in the public interest." 13 The ICA also has eliminated the
requirement for a public hearing. In a further attempt to ensure free
competition, the ICA would grant the CAB the power to summarily
suspend or otherwise modify permits of the airlines of a foreign coun-
try, subject only to subsequent approval by the President of the
United States. This power may be invoked when the CAB finds that:
[the] government, aeronautical authorities, or foreign air carriers of
any foreign country have, over the objections of the Government of
the United States, impaired, limited, or denied the operating
rights of United States air carriers, or engaged in unfair, dis-
criminatory, or restrictive practices with a substantial adverse com-
petitive impact upon the United States carriers, with respect to
flight operations to, from, through, or over the territory of such
country .... 14
Presently, agreements affecting foreign air transportation are ap-
proved if they are not adverse to the public interest or in violation of
the Act. The ICA would limit this traditional test to the approval of those
agreements which would not substantially reduce or eliminate com-
petition. If anticompetitive effects are apparent, the agreement, in
order to be approved, must be necessary to meet a serious transpor-
tation need or to secure important public benefits which cannot be
obtained from a reasonably available alternative means having mate-
rially less anticompetitive effects. The ICA would further make the
filing of such agreements optional. 15
As a reaction to the previous, fragmented approach to negotia-
tions by various agencies, sponsors of the ICA included a permanent,
strong, pro-competitive set of policy goals for negotiation of future
bilateral air transport agreements. 16 Such policy goals are strikingly
similar to those expressed by a recent Presidential statement on this
topic. 17 This statutory statement of goals is expressly directed to the
Secretaries of State and Transportation and the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Each would have to use these goals in developing a negotiat-
ing policy that maximizes competition in the context of a well-
functioning international air transportation system. 18
13. ICA § 7 amending Act § 402(b), 49 U.S.C. § 1372(b) (1976).
14. id.
15 ICA § 11 amending Act § 412, 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).
16. Comments of Senator Cannon, supra note 2, at 7198.
17. 43 Fed. Reg. 22262 (1978). See Aviation Report, supra note 3, at 1040-41.
18. ICA § 17 amending Act § 1102, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
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One ICA goal is to permit carrier freedom in setting fares and
rates in response to consumer demand. Closely linked to the result of
lower fares is the goal which promotes the maximum use of multiple
and permissive authority. New policy goals call for minimization of:
(1) restrictions on charters; (2) operational restrictions; and (3) dis-
crimination and unfair competitive practices faced by United States
airlines in foreign air transportation. These goals promote integration
of domestic and international air transportation, an increase in the
number of nonstop United States gateway cities, and increased access
to United States points by foreign airlines if exchanged for a similar
quantum of benefits for the United States carriers or traveling public.
Such access should be permanently linked to the rights received from
the foreign country. 19
The ICA does not stop at the mere suggestion of policy goals; it
further establishes the International Aviation Advisory Council, which
shall advise the Secretaries of State and Transportation and the Civil
Aeronautics Board regarding general international aviation negotiating
policy and individual negotiations. This Council would be comprised
initially of representatives of the President's Domestic Council, the
Departments of Commerce and Defense, airport operators, scheduled
and charter air carriers, airline labor, consumer interest groups,
travel agents, and tour organizers.
The last provision of the ICA seeks to amend the provisions of
the International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of
1974. 20 This amendment provides a responsive remedy against a
foreign government, agency, or air carrier which: "(1) engages in un-
justifiable or unreasonably discriminatory, predatory, anticompetitive
practices against a United States air carrier; or (2) imposes unjustifi-
able or unreasonable restrictions on access of a United States air car-
rier to foreign markets .... "21 If the CAB makes a finding that
such activity has occurred, it may suspend or otherwise modify the
foreign air carrier's permit or tariff pursuant to its powers under the
Act. This provision gives standing to United States airlines and gov-
ernmental agencies, but not to members of the traveling public.
PROPOSED CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT
In late 1979, a United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries
will consider adopting the proposed Convention on International
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 93-623, 88 Stat. 2103 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 22,
49 U.S C.).
21. ICA § 23 amending International Air Transportation Fair Competitive Prac-
tices Act of 1974 § 2, 49 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1976).
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Multimodal Transport. 22 This Draft Convention has its roots in a
draft Convention on International Combined Transport of Goods,
prepared at meetings attended by the Economic Commission for
Europe and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion in 1970 and 1971. 23 In 1973, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development created an Intergovernmental Preparatory
Group with the duty to create a draft convention covering the mul-
timodal transportation of goods between countries. In its sixth ses-
sion, during February and March 1979, the Preparatory Group
completed the Draft Convention which it recommended for consider-
ation by the U.N. Conference on Plenipotentiaries.
Throughout the decade, the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) has observed and participated in the development of
the Draft Convention. The ICAO appointed a group of Rapporteurs
to analyze and report upon the Draft Convention and its effects on air
transportation. 24 These reports, along with the detailed comments of
the International Air Transport Association, indicate that there is sub-
stantial controversy over whether to include or exclude air transporta-
tion as a mode covered by the Convention. Furthermore, there is
great concern regarding potential conflict between the Draft Conven-
tion, and the Warsaw Convention and its offspring, both adopted and
proposed.
The Draft Convention creates four new precepts which deter-
mine the applicability of the Convention and the resulting relation-
ship between the parties. The first precept, "international multimodal
transport," is defined as the carriage of goods by at least two different
modes of transport on the basis of a "multimodal transport contract"
from a location in one country, where the goods are controlled by a
"multimodal transport operator," to a place of delivery in a different
country. 25 However, any mode of transport that is used for pickup,
delivery, or transshipment incidental to transportation by the primary
mode is not to be considered another mode of transport for purposes
of this definition. Second, a "multimodal transport operator" is any-
one who: (1) concludes a "multimodal transport contract;" (2) acts as a
principal and not as agent on behalf of the consignor or participating
carrier; and (3) assumes responsibility for performance of the con-
tract. 26 Third, a "Multimodal transport contract" is a contract under
22. Draft Convention on International Multimodal Transport, Intergovernmental
Preparatory Group of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
TD/B/AC.15/56 (March 9, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as "Draft Convention"].
23. ICAO Document 9271, LC/182 at 15 (May 29, 1979).
24. Id. at 16.
25. Draft Convention, art. 1, § 1.
26. Id. at § 2.
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which a "multimodal transport operator" receives payment for freight
charges for performing or procuring performance of "international
multimodal transport." 27 Finally, a "multimodal transport docu-
ment" is one which evidences a multimodal transport contract and
the acceptance by the multimodal transport operator of responsibility
for the goods and their transport under the terms of the contract. 28
If the U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries in late 1979 approves
its content, the Convention will apply to contracts for multimodal
transport between two States if one or some combination of events
occur. As now written, the Convention will apply to a multimodal
transport contract if the contract provides that a multimodal transport
operator will take charge of goods in a Contracting State, and/or de-
liver goods in a Contracting State, andor the multimodal transport
document is issued in a Contracting State. 29 The Convention will
also apply if the multimodal transport document states that the Con-
vention or its implementing legislation shall do so. 30
The most pertinent issue for those parties with air transportation
interest is whether the Draft Convention will conflict with any of the
existing or proposed treaties concerning air transportation of prop-
erty. Article 4 of the Draft Convention provides that the Convention
"shall not affect, or be incompatible with, the application of any in-
ternational intergovernmental agreement or national law relating to
the regulation and control of transport operations."'"3 In addition,
each nation will still have the right to regulate and control mul-
timodal transport operations and operators. 32
However, Article 31 of the Warsaw Convention already con-
templates multimodal transportation and provides that, in such cases,
the provisions of Warsaw shall and must apply to the air portions of
the journey. Furthermore, Article 18(3) of the Warsaw Convention
provides that its provisions shall not apply to carriage by land, sea or
river outside of an airport, except where such carriage takes place in
conjunction with an international journey by air for purposes of load-
ing, delivery, or transshipment. Thus, the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention apply to the air portion of multimodal shipments, and to
the ground and water portions as well, where there are ancillary or
incidental services provided, such as pickup, delivery, or transship-
ment.
27. Id. at § 3.
28. Id. at § 4.
29. Draft Convention, art. 2, §§ a-c.
30. Id. at § d.
31. Draft Convention, art. 4, § 1.
32. Id. at § 2.
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Given the mandatory nature of the Warsaw Convention 33 and
the apparent subservience in Article 4 of the Draft Convention, there
would seem to be little cause for concern. However, the Draft Con-
vention includes a proposed Article 3 which explicitly makes the
Convention mandatory when a multimodal transport contract is
within the scope defined in Article 2.
As if this was not confusing enough, the third of three governing
principles in the Preamble to the Draft Convention is to promote
"freedom for shippers to choose between multimodal and segmented
transport services." This raises the problem of defining the difference
between multimodal and segmented services.
There are two ways to view this problem. One view resolves the
question by finding that the Draft Convention creates a new type of
contract, contract sui generis, between the multimodal transport
operator and the shipper or consignor. 34 The relationship between
the operator, as principal, and the various contracting carriers would
continue to be governed by existing unimodal conventions. The sec-
ond view deems the operator to assume the role of carrier because he
undertakes to perform or procure performance over the entire itiner-
ary. If the operator performs the air carriage, the Warsaw Convention
would clearly apply. If the operator contracts for the air carriage, it
must be the "contracting carrier," as defined by Article 1, paragraph
(b) of the Guadalajara Convention of 1961. In the latter case, both the
Warsaw Convention and the Draft Convention would apply between
the shipper and the operator with respect to the carriage by air.
Preeminent potential for conflict between the Draft Convention
and other international agreements dealing with air transportation is
anticipated with the Warsaw Convention, which has been ratified or
adhered to by 110 States. 35 In addition to the potential for conflict
with the Warsaw Convention, there is a possibility of conflict with the
Hague Protocol of 1955, " to which ninety-two States are parties, and
the Guadalajara Convention of 1961, 37 to which fifty-four States are
parties. Furthermore, provisions of the Guatemala City Protocol of
33. See Warsaw Convention, arts. 1, 32.
34. ICAO Document, supra note 23, at 18.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relat-
ing to International Carriage By Air, Av. L. REP. 27,101-128.
37. International Conference on Private Air Law, August-September, 1961, DOC
8301-LC/49.
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1971, 38 although not yet in force, may form the basis for future prob-
lems.
As written, the Draft Convention will conflict with the Warsaw
Convention in at least three major areas. 39 First, the Draft Conven-
tion requires more information on the multimodal transport document
than is required by the Warsaw Convention on the airway bill.
40
Second, the liability of a multimodal transport operator will likely be
less than that provided by the Warsaw Convention. 41 Third, the
provision regarding notice of loss, damage, or delay is different.4 2 At
this moment, the basis for proving liability under the Draft Conven-
tion and the Warsaw Convention are the same-a presumption of
fault and a reversed burden of proof. However, if Montreal Protocol
No. 4 and its provision for strict liability were to become effective, a
significant difference would exist in the burden of proving that the air
carrier was at fault.
The solution offered by the International Air Transport Associa-
tion (IATA) is simple and complete: to exclude air transportation from
the Convention on International Multimodal Transport. The IATA as-
serts that its solution would avoid: (1) conflict between conventions;
(2) the litigation that would occur as shippers shopped for the most
favorable treaty provisions; and (3) many other burdensome and un-
necessary requirements. The IATA reached this conclusion after de-
termining that the Draft Convention was designed to accommodate
intermodal connections among surface carriers. 43 In contrast to sur-
face carriers, air transportation is characterized by high value, low-
weight traveling in non-stackable, low tear weight containers in high
cost vehicles of limited size. Thus, other than for pickup and delivery
38. International Conference on Air Law, Guatemala City, February-March,
1971, DOC 9040-LC/167.
39. Report of the Rapporteurs on the Draft Convention on International Mul-
timodal Transport, ICAO Document 9271, LC/182, Part II, Annex B at 47 (May 29,
1979).
40. Compare Draft Convention, art. 8 with Warsaw Convention, art. 8.
41. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides for a limit of liability equiva-
lent to 17 Special Drawing Rights (an independent unit of exchange established by
the International Monetary Fund) per kilogram. The Intergovernmental Prepara-
tory Group did not establish the limit of liability for the Draft Convention; instead it
left the decision for the Diplomatic Conference. Since the limit of 2.5 Special Draw-
ing Rights per kilogram for transport by sea (United Nations Convention on the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg, March 31, 1978)) is so far below the limit applicable
to transport by air, compromise may be difficult.
42. Compare Draft Convention, art. 24 with Warsaw Convention, art. 26.
43. Surface carriers are those who carry goods by road, rail, inland waterways,
and ocean.
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
services incidental to the primary air transportation, such transporta-
tion involves an insignificant amount of intermodal connections with
surface carriers.
The IATA specifically objects to the introduction of a new docu-
ment, the multimodal transport document, which requires more in-
formation than the Warsaw Convention. Furthermore, it finds the re-
quired negotiable documents of carriage to be unnecessary and costly
for shippers. Since air shipments move swiftly, the documents would
follow the actual goods. Storage of the goods at the point of destina-
tion would therefore be required until the negotiable document could
be tendered for delivery. Another problem arising from the inclusion
of air transportation in the Draft Convention is that shippers would
be subjected to a liability regime designed for the average multimodal
shipment, which liability would be considerably lower in value than
the average high value air shipment. The result would be an added
incentive for litigation to circumvent the Draft Convention.
The remaining difficulty in excluding air transportation and inci-
dental pickup and delivery from the Draft Convention is the possibil-
ity that the success of the Draft Convention would be jeopardized by
its exclusion. IATA submits, however, that the uniqueness of air
cargo shipments and their shippers' needs result in few intermodal
connections beyond those necessary for short-range pickup and deliv-
ery. On the contrary, inclusion of air transportation would hamper
the tailoring of the Draft Convention to suit the needs of the surface
modes of transport.
WARSAW CONVENTION 44
Several recent judicial decisions have aided in the interpretation
of sections of the Warsaw Convention dealing with limitation on lia-
bility. In Illinois ex rel. Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Gil-
berto,45 the Illinois Supreme Court stated that for purposes of de-
termining proper forums for the filing of claims under the Warsaw
Convention, the "domicile" of an airline carrier is not any country
where the airline carries on its business on a "regular and substantial
basis." According to the court, the Convention explicitly defines the
place of domicile of an airline as being the place of its incorporation.
In addition, the court found that the failure of a carrier to give notice
44. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
45. 74 I11. 2d 90, 383 N.E.2d 977 (1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 2052 (1979).
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on its passengers' tickets as to forums with jurisdiction over such
claims did not preclude utilization of the limitation of liability pro-
vided in the Convention.
The action arose from the hijacking of an Air France airplane
during the Athens to Paris leg of a flight routed from Tel Aviv, Israel
to Athens, Greece to Paris, France. Eighty-one plaintiffs brought suit
on behalf of themselves or their decedents, who as passengers, suf-
fered physical and emotional injuries or death at the hands of
hijackers.
Suit was instituted in Cook County, Illinois. Air France moved
to dismiss on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
the Warsaw Convention. 16
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a country where
an airline does a regular and substantial amount of business is a
domicile for purposes of jurisdiction under Article 28(1) of the War-
saw Convention. 47 It did so by determining that Article 28(1) was
totally incompatible with plaintiffs' claim, insofar as it explicitly estab-
lished two places where an action for damages may be brought: (1) the
principal place of business of the carrier; and (2) the place of business
where the contract of carriage was made. The court held that this
provision of the Convention forecloses the creation of any other
category for jurisdictional purposes. 48
The plaintiffs also sought to remove the limitation of liability im-
posed by the Convention (approximately $8,300) by claiming that the
carrier's failure to give notice as to the limitations of Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention was the equivalent of a failure to inform
them of a monetary limitation under Article 22, which precludes a
carrier from reliance on that limitation. 49 Distinguishing the cases
46. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention limits jurisdiction for an action for
damages to the country of the: (1) domicile of the carrier; (2) its principal place of
business; (3) the place of business through which the contract was made; or (4) the
place of destination.
47. The text of Article 28(1) states:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the
place of destination.
48. The court appeared concerned at the possibility that, in accepting plaintiff's
contentions, it might appear to add an amendment to the Convention unilaterally.
Illinois ex rel. Compagnie Nationale, 74 Ill. 2d at 95, 383 N.E.2d at 981.
49. Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention sets a monetary ceiling on liability at
$16,000, unless death or damages was caused by the defendants' "wilful misconduct."
Hague Protocol of 1965, supra note 36.
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that would eliminate the limitation because of such failure, the court
found that "[t]he provisions of Article 28(1) limiting the places where
a carrier may be sued are not provisions 'which exclude or limit his
liability,' and the latter phrase refers only to the monetary ceiling on
damages found in article 22." The court rationalized that the purpose
for requiring disclosure to a passenger that the amount of recovery
may be limited if he should be killed or injured in an accident is to
enable the prospective passenger to take protective measures, such as
taking out additional insurance. The court could not, however, per-
ceive any comparable reason why the individual passengers would
have cared to know in which Convention country an action for dam-
ages must be brought.
In Bianchi v. United Air Lines, 5 a Washington state appeals
court held that the Warsaw Convention is a sovereign treaty and
supreme law of the land, and as such, preempts any local common
laws of material deviation from a contract which might avoid any
limits to the air carrier's liability found in the contract of carriage.
The plaintiff in this case sought air freight shipment of a promissory
note from Seattle, Washington, to Matzatlan, Mexico. A United Air-
lines employee assured the plaintiff that one of United's flights would
arrive in Los Angeles in time to connect with a Mexicana airline flight
scheduled to arrive in Matzatlan the next day. Four days later, the
envelope was transferred from United to Mexicana and delivered in
Mexico to the consignee. The plaintiff sued for damages greater than
the liability limits set forth in either the applicable tariff schedules or
the Warsaw Convention liability limitations of $9.07 per pound. He
contended that he should be allowed to recover a $10,000 loss which
arose from a devaluation of the Mexican peso which had occurred
during the four days in which the shipment of the promissory note
had been delayed.
The law is well settled that tariffs filed and approved pursuant to
a statute constitute the conditions of the contract of carriage between
the parties and give rise in force and effect to the law governing any
disputes between the parties. 51 The common law doctrine of mate-
rial deviation has been invoked upon occasion to abrogate the under-
lying contract. Regardless of the substantial deviation from the
bargained-for consideration, as represented by United's express
This Protocol was approved and signed by the President of the United States,
but never ratified by the Senate.
50. 22 Wash. App. 81, 587 P.2d 632 (1978).
51. See text accompanying notes 81-85, infra.
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assurances, the court found that the Warsaw Convention preempts
any local law which would act to overcome the Convention's limita-
tions of liability for loss on air freight claims.
In Julius Young Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 52 a
New York appellate court held that the liability limitations of the
Warsaw Convention extend to protect an air carrier's agent where the
agent is "performing functions the carrier could or would . . . other-
wise perform itself."5 3  In this case, the plaintiff checked jewelry
sample cases as baggage in international transportation for a two car-
rier connecting flight. These bags were lost at the connecting point
where a third party service company was employed by one of the
carrying airlines to transfer inter-line baggage between the connecting
flights. The plaintiff sought to avoid the limitation of liability as set
forth in the Warsaw Convention by asserting that these protections
given to air carriers do not apply to agents of air carriers. 54
Buttressed by the twin aims of the Warsaw Convention-
limitation of liability and uniformity of law-the court determined
that the purpose of the Convention would be undermined by permit-
ting unlimited recovery against a party which is part of the airline
enterprise itself. 55 Extending the principle of the recent case of
Reed v. Wiser, 56 the court held that the rationale for applying limita-
tions of liability to employees and servants of air carriers should be
applied to the agents of such carriers. Thus, whenever a person or
company is performing a service in furtherance of the contract of car-
riage and in place of the carrier itself, it is protected by the limita-
tions of liability contained in the Warsaw Convention.
In Olshin v. El Al Israel Airlines, 57 the court refused to apply
the wilful misconduct exception to the Warsaw Convention's limita-
tion of liability for loss of baggage where the carrier had no knowl-
edge that jewelry was in the baggage, and therefore, could not have
intentionally failed to warn of the danger of theft. On a trip from New
York to Tel Aviv, Israel, the plaintiff carried jewelry valued at $100,000
enclosed in a jewelry bag inside her suitcase. The plaintiff did not
inform the airlines of the high value contents; however, employees of
52. 67 App. Div.2d 148, 414 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979).
53. 67 App. Div.2d at 150, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 530 (1979).
54. The difference is not insignificant as reflected here where plaintiff's claim for
lost baggage would be limited from $55,000 to $1,338. Id.
55. Id.
56. 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
57. 15 Av. L. REP. 17,463 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
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the Israeli Government saw the jewelry during a pre-flight security
inspection. Upon arrival in Tel Aviv, the jewelry bag was missing.
Although the plaintiff admitted that the Warsaw Convention gov-
erned liability for the loss, she asserted the "wilful misconduct" ex-
ception by claiming that the airlines had knowledge of a history of
thefts and failed to warn her thereof. The court, however, utilized a
four part burden ,of proof test which makes recovery more difficult,
and in fact, impossible in the case of this plaintiff. The test for wilful
misconduct is established upon the showing that "defendant: (1) was
aware that she had jewelry in her baggage; (2) knew that there was a
danger that the jewelry would be stolen; (3) intentionally failed to
warn her of this danger; and (4) knew that the failure to warn plaintiff
of the danger would probably result in the loss of the jewelry."5s
Upon determining the defendant's lack of knowledge concerning the
jewelry, the court found that it was therefore impossible for the de-
fendant to have intentionally failed to warn the plaintiff.
In Fridar v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 59 the court
held that upon the complete absence of a factual basis for a charge of
wilful misconduct, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment
limiting liability for lost baggage to the amount permitted by the
Warsaw Convention and the air carriers' filed tariffs. 60
In Swiss Bank Corp. v. First National City Bank, 61 a United
States District Court held that the limitations of liability of the
Warsaw Convention could not be circumvented by a state law that pro-
vides for contribution among joint tortfeasors. In this case, the plain-
tiff, Swiss Bank Corp., sent a series of nine gold coin shipments from
Europe via Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., to First National City Bank
(now Citibank) in New York. In each case, the consignee, Citibank,
was instructed by Swiss Bank to turn over the coins to the ultimate
buyer, Metropolitan Rare Coin Exchange, Inc., against payment. The
coins, however, were always transferred from Swiss Air through cus-
toms agents to Metropolitan, and payment by Metropolitan to the
plaintiff's account at Citibank followed thereafter. All went well until
the seventh shipment when Metropolitan, subsequent to delivery of
the goods, went out of business and failed to pay for the shipment.
58. Id. at 17,464.
59. 15 Av. L. REP. 17,559 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978).
60. Tariffs for international transportation of passengers are filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board pursuant to § 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976 & Supp. 1979).
61. 15 Av. L. REP. 17,631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Suit was then instituted by Swiss Bank against Swiss Air and
Citibank. Swiss Air settled with plaintiff Swiss Bank for the full
amount of its potential liability as limited by Article 22(2) of the
Warsaw Convention. 62 This amount, $3,355.44 (including interest), was
significantly less than even a small portion of the $637,000 value of
the gold coin shipment. 63 In an effort to protect itself, Citibank
crossclaimed against Swiss Air, claiming that it had a duty to the con-
signee (Citibank), as well as the consignor (Swiss Bank). Swiss Air's
negligence, breach of a contract of carriage-of which Citibank was a
third party beneficiary-and breach of its obligations as bailee,
violated duties owed to the consignee as well as the consignor. Swiss
Air moved for a summary judgment to dismiss Citibank's cross-
complaint. The court held that the cross-complaint did not state a
claim for contribution or for liability over the Warsaw Convention's
aggregate limit of liability for an air carrier with respect to the lost
cargo. Any payment above this amount directly to Swiss Bank or indi-
rectly through reimbursement to Citibank was beyond the carrier's
legal liability as established by the Warsaw Convention.
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (IATA)
The CAB is continuously seeking ways to successfully: (1) with-
draw approval, under §412 of the Act, of IATA air traffic conference
agreements; and (2) discontinue the antitrust immunity awarded
under §414 of the Act. 64 The CAB has significantly altered the orig-
inal procedure for disposing of this situation. 65 Response to the CAB
Order to Show Cause 6 6 was enormous; forty-eight countries and
sixty-five airlines, travel agencies, shipping interests, and other organi-
zations filed comments. 67 If the original procedure had been exe-
cuted on schedule, the next procedural step would have been a CAB
order finalizing or rejecting its tentative findings in the Order to
Show Cause. With the significance and complexity of the issues be-
coming more apparent, however, the CAB found it necessary to con-
duct additional proceedings.
62. Id. at 15,632.
63. Id. at 15,631,
64. Agreements adopted by the International Air Transport Association relating to
the Traffic Conference, Docket 32851 (Agreement C.A.B. 1175 as amended). See
generally, Aviation Report, supra note 3, at 1037-41.
65. See C.A.B. Order 79-5-113, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1979).
66. C.A.B. Order 78-6-78, 43 Fed. Reg. 25,839 (1978). See Aviation Report,
supra note 3, at 1037-41.
67. C.A.B. Order 79-5-113, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,509, 29,510 (1979).
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Since the IATA members agreed to a reorganization of its struc-
ture, and the instituting order had addressed only the old IATA
structure, the IATA requested that the new traffic conference
amendments be considered together. 68 In the new structure, IATA
members would be required to participate in trade association ac-
tivities, such as technical and medical activities, legal facilitation,
clearing house activities, standardization of passenger baggage and
cargo handling, and multilateral interline traffic agreements. Mem-
bership on the tariff coordinating committees would be optional. Pro-
vision was also made for unilateral fare actions, and in certain cases,
suspension of the tariff conferences. Given the importance of the
changes and the greater future relevance of the restructured IATA,
the CAB permitted consolidation for the consideration of the amend-
ments submitted for permanent approval under §412 of the Act. 69
Pending the CAB's final determination with regard to the amend-
ments, the IATA also sought interim approval of its new structure
and antitrust immunity for the Association. Although the CAB did
grant interim approval with regard to antitrust immunity, it did not
do so as a preliminary indication of its approval of the revised rate
conferences. Although it initially appeared that the CAB was testing
the revised structure, 70 it eventually clarified the primary reason for
the grant of interim approval. 71 Since the CAB had continued to
grant immunity pending decision on the basic IATA agreement, there
was no reason to deviate from that approach while considering the
amendments. Although not stated specifically, the CAB must have
considered the lessened anti-competitive effects resulting from the
implementation of some competitive fare innovations and by allowing
the IATA to withdraw from rate conferences. Furthermore, the CAB
favored antitrust immunity over the confusion and dehabilitating ef-
fect of an antitrust action during this interim period before its final
decision.
As a precursor to a probable end result, the CAB hinted that
differences in legal and policy considerations would likely require par-
tial approval and partial disapproval. 72 For example, the CAB ob-
served that air transportation which does not directly affect the
United States may be treated differently than air transportation to
68. 44 Fed. Reg. at 24,509-10. See also Aviation Report, 11 LAW. AM. 186,
186-87 (1979).
69. 44 Fed. Reg. at 24,510.
70. Id. at 25,510-11.
71. C.A.B. Order 79-6-65, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,055 (1979).
72. C.A.B. Order 79-5-113, 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,511.
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and from the United States, and that "trade association" activities
may be treated differently than rate-setting conferences. Without
committing itself to a course of action, the CAB suggested that the
parties might wish to address the prospect that it would:
(a) approve the entire new structure of IATA as it affects air transpor-
tation not involving the United States directly;
(b) approve the "trade association" conferences as they affect the
United States; and
(c) disapprove the tariff conferences to the extent they affect rates to
or from the United States. 73
The CAB recognized and reaffirmed the primary focus of the ini-
tial Show Cause Order and identified over one hundred rate and
rate-related IATA resolutions which will be reviewed for possible dis-
approval. 74
The CAB narrowed the scope of its proceedings by making a
summary determination regarding 112 IATA resolutions which "are
not anti-competitive in nature and may result in valuable efficien-
cies." 75 The CAB found that these resolutions are in the nature of
facilitation agreements, and under the new IATA structure, would be
the responsibility of the "trade association" conferences. Such resolu-
tions "are designed to standardize and thus simplify a variety of in-
teractions between carriers so that the complex network of interna-
tional aviation can function smoothly and passengers can move easily
between the various components of the system." 76 Thus, resolutions
which deal with the relationship between carriers, or between car-
riers and passengers-such as those relating to technical specifica-
tions on documents and standard definitions of communications-
generally do not have competitive implications. For the 112 resolu-
tions that are in this category, the CAB withdrew its tentative finding
of disapproval and terminated the investigation announced in the ini-
tial Order to Show Cause.
Not all trade association resolutions were found to be free of pos-
sible anti-competitive effects. However, the CAB decided to analyze
and rule on these resolutions in a separate investigation to be insti-
tuted on another docket. 77 Also, the CAB severed all resolutions
73. Id.
74. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,511, 29,513 (App. C).
75. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,511, 29,513 (App. B).
76. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,511.
77. Id.
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relating to the IATA passenger agency program which provides for
multilateral appointment of international ticket agents. Since the is-
sues and the language are similar to the passenger agency program in
effect within the United States through the Air Traffic Conference,
the CAB found it more efficient to treat the international and the
domestic area in a separate proceeding on another docket. Similar
concerns in the cargo agency program prompted the CAB to sever
cargo agency resolutions and consolidate them for consideration with
the passenger agency investigation. 73
The show cause procedure, by its very nature, seeks to avoid the
ordinary procedural steps of exhibits, briefs, and hearings. Despite its
original choice of procedural devices and the receipt of voluminous
comments, the CAB, in its quest for further analysis of the facts and
policy issues, has decided to conduct a "legislative" hearing. 79 Un-
common to contemporary CAB practice, this hearing will entail tes-
timony, briefs, and oral argument before the Board members. A
majority of the Board chose these extended proceedings because of the
need for further examination of the positions of those responding to
the Order to Show Cause, not because of a newfound legal mandate
or the existence of a material and determinative issue of fact yet un-
resolved.
In the comments responding to the Order to Show Cause, none
of the parties asserted that this proceeding is an "on-the-record ad-
judication" invoking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
regarding quasi-judicial hearings. Furthermore, no party insisted that
hearings to determine approval or disapproval are mandatory or need
be adjudicatory in nature. Moreover, the CAB determined that §1006
of the Act, which provides that findings of fact are conclusive on judi-
cial review if supported by substantial evidence, does not require an
evidentiary hearing. The CAB distinguished between adjudicative
facts, such as those needed to resolve specific controversies between
specific parties, and legislative facts, such as perceptions of policy,
present and future economics, and relationships in the international
arena. 80
The CAB found that having a hearing before an administrative
law judge would unnecessarily delay the proceedings and dilute the
78. Id.
79. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,511-12.
80. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,512.
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impact of face-to-face confrontation between the decisionmakers and
the experts. Thus, the majority of the Board decided to forego the
benefit of an administrative law judge's consideration and decision.
The majority also decided against adversarial cross-examination in
favor of free exploration of alternative policy options. 8 '
After this substantial narrowing of substantive areas and the ex-
pansion of procedural steps, the CAB focused upon the two remain-
ing primary issues: (1) whether the IATA structure-old or newly
amended-should be approved; and (2) whether the approval of rate
and rate-related provisions should be continued. 82 The CAB placed
special emphasis on the generation of detailed economic analysis of
the relative costs and benefits of continued approval, total disap-
proval, or partial disapproval of the IATA. The CAB solicited the same
intensive analysis regarding the differing treatment in various regions
of the world among participants in air transportation.
As a final and comprehensive briefing of the CAB's expectations
concerning the legislative proceedings, the CAB listed suggested
topics for comment. The breadth of these topics demonstrate that,
despite the CAB's considerable paring of the issues, this proceeding
promises to be one of the largest, most complex, and theoretical in
aviation history. The ten suggested topics in summarized form are as
follows:
(1) Is multilateral rule-setting necessary, and what are the relative
costs and benefits?
(2) What portion of international travel is to and from the United
States by citizens of other countries, and what portion thereof
is by United States citizens?
(3) Without a multilateral rate agreement, are carriers' rates of
return, prices, and traffic growth rates in markets higher,
lower, or the same as in comparable markets where a mul-
tilateral rate agreement is in force?
(4) Will CAB disapproval of traffic conferences result in lower,
economically viable fares which produce increased interna-
tional travel and benefits to the affected countries?
(5) Will the impact of disapproval or withdrawal of immunity from
traffic conferences be more adverse to certain countries, and if
so, is such treatment justified and feasible?
81. Id.
82. Id.
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(6) What is the extent of a subsidy to internal and external travel
by each country's nationals, and what is the proper impact of
this factor on the CAB's approval of traffic conferences?
(7) Has the IATA's "unanimity rule" led to fixed rates at the level
of the least efficient carrier, and can a cross -subsidization effect
be avoided?
(8) What would be the effect if all United States carriers opted-
out of the traffic conferences affecting the United States?
(9) In lieu of traffic conferences, could "mutual disapproval" rate
articles, "country of origin" rate articles, or bilateral negotia-
tions with "Bermuda I" rate articles function as a substitute?
(10) Is a method of staged transition toward elimination of traffic
conferences feasible and beneficial?
8 3
CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
Legal Effect of Tariffs
Section 403(a) of the Act requires that each United States and
foreign air carrier file tariffs with the CAB showing rates, fares,
charges, and rules for all air transportation provided by itself, alone,
or in conjunction with another air carrier. 8 Section 403(b) of the Act
prohibits air carriers from charging or receiving any amount different
than that stated in its tariffs, or received from directly or indirectly
refunding or remitting all or any portion of the charges for services
rendered.8 5  Over the years, case law has established that "[t]ariffs
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board ... are conclusive and exclu-
sive, and that the rights and liabilities between airlines and their pas-
sengers are governed thereby."8' 6 In fact, a lawfully filed tariff ob-
tains a character beyond a mere contractual provision; it rises to the
force and effect of a statute if filed under statutory compulsion.
8 7
83. 44 Fed. Reg. at 29,512-14.
84. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976).
85. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1976 & Supp. 1979).
86, Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401, 1403 (2d Cir. 1969).
Accord, Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Lichten v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
87. Circuit Judge Brown of the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
stated:
Filed as it was under compulsion of § 403(a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 [predecessor of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958], the tariff carried
the statutory mandate of § 403(b) that it and it alone was to be the sole
standard for services to be rendered and charges assessed and collected. In
the implementation of this stringent legislative policy, the courts have
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Furthermore, case law has established that a customer has construc-
tive notice of the terms and conditions of the contract through tariffs
lawfully on file pursuant to a statute.8 8
Through regulatory action subsequent to the enactment of the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, however, the legal effect of tariffs
has been altered. The liberalized powers of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 197889 enabled the CAB to exempt the airlines from filing
tariffs for air transportation of cargo solely within the United States
and its territories. 90 After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain
reinstatement by the courts, the remaining cargo tariffs were
cancelled on March 14, 1979. In accord with the competitive aims of
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 91 and the deregulation of all-
cargo service in 1977,92 the CAB seeks to foster free and immediate
competitive pricing decisions in response to market forces, avoiding
the artificial uniformity of posted tariff prices. 9 3  However, by
been equally emphatic that the basis for the charge or credit must be
found in the tariff. If it is not in the tariff, it is not allowable. It is not a
mere matter of contract. For "a rate once regularly published is no longer
merely the rate imposed by the carrier, but becomes the rate imposed by
law." Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dickerson, 6 Cir. 1911, 191 F. 705, 709.
"Such tariffs, at least those which are factors in determining the carrier's
charges, have the force and effect of statutes." American Ry. Express Co.
v. American Trust Co., 7 Cir., 1931, 47 F.2d 16, 18. The tariffs are both
conclusive and exclusive; they may not be added to through reference to
outside contracts or agreements or understandings or promises.
United States v. Associated Air Transport, Inc., 275 F.2d 827, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1960)
(footnotes omitted). Accord, Crosby & Co., Inc. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
76 Misc. 2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp.
360 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Carter v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 365 F.2d 486
(5th Cir. 1966); Slick Airways, Inc. v. United States, 292 F.2d 515 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
88. E.g., Crosby & Co., Inc. v. Coipagnie Nationale Air France, 76 Misc. 2d
990, 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Sechler v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. L. REP.
18,185, 18,186 (Ct. App. Cal.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Mao v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v.
Delta Air Lines, 275 F. Supp. 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y 1967), aff'd, 413 F.2d 1401 (2d
Cir. 1969); Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 826 (1962).
89. ADA § 31, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) (1976). Prior to the ADA, the
CAB had to find an "undue burden" on a carrier due to the "limited extent" of its
operations or "unusual circumstances" affecting a carrier's operations. After the ADA,
the CAB need only find that the proposed exemption is consistent with the public
interest.
90. § 291.31(a) of the Board's Economic Regulations, promulgated in Regulation
ER-1080, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,628 (1978), to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 291.31.
91. ADA § 3, supra note 1, amending 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
92. Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1281 (1977).
93. 43 Fed. Reg. 58,210 (1978).
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exempting carriers from the tariff filing requirement, the CAB al-
tered the legal effect of the carriers' legal relationship with the ship-
pers. Indeed, the CAB openly recognized this difference 94 when it
granted a similar exemption from tariff filing requirements to indirect
air carriers for both domestic and international air transportation of
cargo. 9 5
As a result of the exemptions granted by the CAB, the legal
significance of the carriers' contracts for domestic transportation of
property does not emanate from the tariffs since they no longer must
be filed pursuant to statute. The tariffs are merely terms and condi-
tions of contract subject to the common law of common carriage and
the general common law of contracts of the various states. The tariff
provisions are thus no longer the equivalent of law. Furthermore, it
is unlikely that the shipper can be deemed to have constructive
notice of the provisions of a contract which are neither noted nor
described on the airway bill itself.
Shortly after the enactment of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, the CAB exempted both United States and foreign air carriers
from § 403(b) of the Act:
to the extent necessary to enable each carrier to compensate or
make monetary adjustments to any passenger who registers a com-
plaint or claim for an expense incurred or for a loss or any other
damage sustained as a result of the carrier's or its agent's negli-
gence, misrepresentation, or other act or omission which in the
carrier's judgment justifies such payment of compensation or ad-
justment .... 9
According to the CAB, this exemption would remove any statutory
prohibition of rebating as long as carriers use them in an attempt to
make a monetary settlement of legitimate disputes. The CAB
apparently did not intend for carriers to ignore or deviate from their
tariffs when the dispute was clearly governed by the tariffs. However,
monetary compensation might be used in dealing with problems
94. Regulation ER-1094, 44 Fed. Reg. 6634, 6635-37 (1979).
95. § 296.10(b) of the Board's Regulations promulgated in Regulation ER-.1094, 44
Fed. Reg. 6634 (1979), to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 296.10(b). Indirect air carriers
are U.S. citizens who indirectly engage in air transportation of cargo through direct
air carriers -airlines engaged in air transportation pursuant to a certificate, regula-
tion, order or permit issued by the CAB. See 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1976); 44 Fed.
Reg. 6640 (1979), to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 296.3(d). The most common indirect
air carriers are air freight forwarders and cooperative shippers associations. See 44
Fed. Reg. 6640 (1979), to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 296.3(a),(b).
96. C.A.B. Order 78-12-49, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,210, 58,211 (1978).
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which are "not dealt with or anticipated in the tariffs .. ."97 Later,
the CAB amended the exemption to make it clear that monetary ad-
justments could be made to any "passenger or shipper who registers
a complaint or claim ... 98
Although the CAB intends to attack any general use of rebates to
routinely discount regular fares or rates, 9 9 it has exempted carriers
from the § 403(b) prohibitions on rebating in cases of legitimate dis-
putes. Since most of the cases establishing the legal effect of tariffs
depended upon the statutory mandate of § 403(b), which makes tariffs
the exclusive terms and conditions of contract, 1'0 the legal signifi-
cance of all passenger tariffs and the remaining international cargo
tariffs 101 may be in jeopardy.
Investigation of Baggage Claims
On April 27, 1979, the Civil Aeronautics Board instituted an in-
vestigation into airlines practices in handling international baggage
claims. 10 2 This informal, non-public investigation was prompted by
numerous consumer complaints regarding the practices of United
States and foreign airlines in settling claims for lost, damaged, or pil-
fered checked baggage in international air transportation, as defined
by the Warsaw Convention. Consumers have complained of settle-
ments in which they collected considerably less than the actual value
of their loss, for the complete denial of claims for damage to fragile or
perishable items, and for loss of jewelry and other high-value items.
The Warsaw Convention is applicable to airlines serving the
United States via the provisions regarding certificates of public con-
venience and necessity or foreign air carrier permits. The Convention
does allow limitation of liability for claims related to checked baggage,
but only if the carrier enters the number of pieces and actual weight
97. 43 Fed. Reg. at 58,211.
98. C.A.B. Order 79-2-23, 44 Fed. Reg. 2186 (1979).
99. Section 404(a) requires that carriers "establish, observe, and enforce just and
reasonable .. . rates, fares, and charges, and . . . classifications, rules, regulations,
and practices relating to such air transportation ...." 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(a)(1),(2)
(1976). Section 411 prohibits "unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of com-
petition." 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
100. See notes 3-5, supra.
101. Since carriers have been exempted from the requirement to file tariffs for air
transportation of property within the United States and its territories, the exemption
issued in C.A.B. Orders 79-12-49 and 79-2-23 only impact tariffs for cargo in interna-
tional air transportation. See text accompanying notes 6-11 supra.
102. C.A.B. Order 79-4-194, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,136 (1979).
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of the checked baggage on the passenger's baggage check.' 0 3 Other-
wise, any attempt at limitation of liability by tariff or contractual pro-
vision has no legal effect. In those cases where the carriers have
limited or denied liability and no recordation of pieces or weight was
made, the Board contemplates that the carrier has engaged in an un-
fair and deceptive act in violation of § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 104 and the terms and conditions of their certificate or permit.
Accordingly, the CAB instituted an investigation to determine if a
formal enforcement action or other action should be taken.
Suspensions and Terminations of Service
On April 2, 1979, the Civil Aeronautics Board issued an Interim
Rule 10 5 formally implementing and expanding upon the new suspen-
sion, termination, and reduction provision of the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978. Section 401(j)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act' 0 6 now pro-
vides for ninety days advance notice of a carrier's intent to suspend
all service at a point on its certificate or intent to reduce service
below the level that the CAB has determined to be Essential Air
Transportation for such point. Section 401(j)(2) of the Act provides for
sixty days notice of a carrier's suspension of the last certificated
nonstop or single-plane service between a pair of points.' 0 7 Regula-
tion PR-200 resolved a number of questions about the application of
these § 401 provisions, some of which directly affected service by
United States airlines to foreign points. However, Regulation PR-200
was not the first occasion that the CAB addressed and ruled upon the
impact of § 104 on international air transportation.
On December 6, 1978, little more than a month after the enact-
ment of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pan American World
Airways, Inc. (Pan Am) made an application for authority to temporar-
ily suspend service at Glasgow, England. 10 8 Pan Am was providing
only all-cargo flights to Glasgow on an eastbound route between the
United States and Europe. Pan Am made its application in the man-
ner traditionally appropriate for applications pursuant to § 401(j) of
the Federal Aviation Act and Part 205 of the Board's Economic
103. Warsaw Convention, supra note 44, at art. 4.
104. 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976).
105. Regulation PR-200, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,635 (1979).
106. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)(1) (Supp. 1979).
107. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)(2) (Supp. 1979).
108. Application of Pan American World Airways, Inc. for Temporary Suspension
Authority at Glasgow, Scotland, Docket 34184 (Dec. 6, 1978).
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Regulations in effect prior to the enactment of the Deregulation Act.
Pan Am requested suspension authority effective February 1, 1979,
for an indefinite period.
On December 15, 1978, Pan Am filed a motion to dismiss its
application and filed a Petition For A Declaratory Order Or Other
Relief. The motion for dismissal was based upon the ground that Pan
Am already held authority to suspend service from a prior Board Or-
der; thus, the Application for Temporary Suspension Authority was
moot.109 The petition for declaratory or other relief was prompted
by an informal communication from the CAB's staff concerning the
CAB's determination that the ninety day notice provision of
§ 401(j)(1) of the Act does apply to international points and that, there-
fore, Pan Am's application, dated December 6, 1978, for intended
suspension on February 1, 1979, did not give the requisite ninety
days notice. 110 The petition sought an interpretation of § 401(j)(1)
which w~uld make the provision inapplicable to international points,
or if it did apply, would grant an exemption from the requirement to
give a full ninety days notice.
Since the language of § 401(j) is not explicit and the legislative
history does not provide adequate discussion, Pan Am resorted to an
elaborate analysis of the terminology of the Federal Aviation Act, as
newly amended. Subsection (A) of § 4010)(1) addresses suspension or
termination of service to "a point," while subsection (B) addresses
reduction of service below the level which the CAB has determined
to be Essential Air Transportation to "such point." Section 419 of the
Act, which implemented the Deregulation Act's provisions regarding
Essential Air Transportation, is limited solely to points in the United
States and its territories.'1 1 Pan Am reasoned that since the term
"point" for purposes of reductions under § 401(j)(1)(B) must be a
United States point, and since the phrase "such point" as used in that
subsection referred back to the word "point" in § 401(j)(1)(A), then
the meaning of "point" in both subsections (A) and (B) must be
limited to United States points.
As further proof, Pan Am noted that § 401(j)(1) requires service
of the ninety day notice on the CAB, any community affected by the
109. See Motion of Pan American World Airways, Inc. to Dismiss Application,
Docket 34184 (Dec. 15, 1978).
110. See Petition of Pan American World Airways, Inc. for Declaratory Order or
Other Relief, Docket 34184 (Dec. 15, 1978).
111. 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1979).
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change in service, and "the State agency of the State in which such
community is located" (emphasis added). 1 12 Since § 401(j)(1) does
not provide for service of a foreign country and since the notice pro-
visions of § 401(j)(1) are virtually identical to those in §§ 419(a)(3)(A)
and (B), Pan Am found further support for the interpretation that the
notice provisions of § 401(j)(1) do not apply to international points.
Before the Deregulation Act, § 401(j)(1) provided that "[t]he
Board may, by regulation or otherwise, authorize such temporary
suspension of service as may be in the public interest." 113 This pro-
vision was retained in § 401(j)(1) as enacted by the Deregulation Act.
However, the provision requiring application to the Board before a
carrier could abandon service was replaced by the ninety day notice
provision. Given the limitation of the notice requirement to United
States points, Pan Am argued that the temporary suspension power of
the CAB was still applicable to international points.
One day prior to Pan Am's intended suspension at Glasgow, the
CAB issued an order which took no action to prohibit the suspension.
Without deciding the issue of whether § 401(j)(1) applies to interna-
tional points, the CAB exempted Pan Am from the ninety day notice
provision, to the extent necessary, to permit suspension of service on
February 1, 1979.114 The CAB also dismissed the petition for a de-
claratory order or other relief, deferring ultimate interpretation of the
suspension provisions of the new act for the up-coming rulemaking
proceeding. The CAB stated that, pending a final decision in the
rulemaking, it expected carriers to file notices as if § 401 did apply to
foreign operations. Such notice would permit the CAB to consider
whether action should be taken to replace the suspended foreign air
transportation service. This replacement decision and action, as the
CAB noted, would be separate and distinct from the Board's powers
under the § 419 Essential Air Transportation provisions, which clearly
do not apply to foreign points or to all-cargo operations.
Two months later, the CAB adopted Regulation PR-200, an In-
terim Rule"" which will remain effective until any final adjustments
are made by the CAB, after the submission of comments by in-
terested parties. The CAB reiterated the issues and arguments raised
in Pan Am's Glasgow suspension case. Adopting Pan Am's method of
112. 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)(1) (Supp. 1979).
113. 49 U.S.C. §1371(j) (1976) (amended 1978).
114. C.A.B. Order 79-1-188, Docket 34184 (Jan. 31, 1979).
115. 44 Fed. Reg. 20,635 (1979).
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analysis by examining § 419, which clearly applies only to the United
States points, and studying the nuances of the wording in
§ 401(j)(1)(B) service reductions and § 401(j)(1)(A) suspensions and
terminations, the CAB concluded that the ninety day notice provision
and the temporary suspension provision of § 401(j)(1) do not apply to
the discontinuation of service to foreign points.'
16
Although § 401(j)(2) requires a sixty day notice of a carrier's sus-
pension of termination of the last certificated nonstop or single-plane
air transportation between two "points," the CAB concluded that this
provision does apply to foreign points, 1 1 7 and that § 401(j)(2) does not
contain an explicit reference to the Essential Air Transportation pro-
visions. Furthermore, no provision is made for service on a State or
its officers. To satisfy greater interests in foreign aviation policy and
the consumer, the CAB, pursuant to its general rulemaking powers,
overstepped the Act's requirements and required notice of all, not
just the last, certificated single-plane service between a United States
point and a foreign point. For some unexplained reason, however,
the CAB did not expand the notice requirement for nonstop
service-a much more significant and beneficial service than single-
plane service.
Using the same rationale as it used to limit § 401(j)(1) to
United States points, the CAB concluded that § 401(j)(1) does not
apply to all-cargo service. 118 Since the § 419 Essential Air Transpor-
tation provisions apply only to passenger service, § 401(j)(1)(B), as
well as § 401(j)(1)(A), could not apply to all-cargo service. Although
§ 4010)(2) does not have the same relationship to § 419, the CAB
concluded that the sixty day notice provision of § 401 (j)(2) does not
apply to all-cargo operations because nonstop and single-plane service
are significant only to consumers of passenger service. Under its
general rulemaking powers, however, the CAB required a sixty day
notice of suspension of any all-cargo service to a foreign point. Such
notice would give the CAB time to consider applications by other
carriers in these markets where entry is more restricted than in
domestic United States markets. Also, this would give advance notice
to United States communities so that they may take appropriate ac-
tion in contemplation of the loss of service.
The CAB was sensitive to the differing nature of air transporta-
tion in overseas and foreign markets as opposed to that within the
116. Id. at 20,637.
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forty-eight contiguous States. Blanket exemptions from the require-
ment for the sixty day notice of suspension of nonstop or single-plane
service wholly within the continental United States were granted in
three instances. 119 No such notice is required where the service to
be suspended is provided in one direction only, is operated less than
four days per week, or makes three or more intermediate stops.' 20
Recognizing that such types of service are more often significant in air
transportation between the United States mainland and its territories
or foreign points, the CAB did not extend the exemptions to such
service.
Since the CAB found that the notice provisions of the Deregula-
tion Act have superseded the advance application and prior approval
process, it revoked Part 205 of the CAB's Economic Regulations gov-
erning temporary suspensions and postponements of inauguration of
service.' The CAB retained provisions granting themselves tem-
porary suspension powers which may be used in situations such as
the interruptions of service beyond a carrier's control.
119. Id. at 20,638-40.
120. Id. at 20,644, to be codified in 49 C.F.R. § 323.8.
121. Regulation ER-1112, Amendment 6, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,635 (1979).
